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When our mind wanders, we frequently experience thoughts, images, and feelings about 
ourselves and our life. These self-referential thoughts involve diverse contents and take 
various forms, but most often focus on specific future events that are closely related to our 
personal goals and concerns. Neuroimaging studies show that such spontaneous mentations 
recruit many of the same brain regions—largely corresponding to the default network—as 
directed self-referential thought. The medial prefrontal cortex is most consistently involved 
and might contribute to assign value and to integrate processed contents with autobiographical 
knowledge. The tendency of the wandering mind to focus on self-related information might 
foster our sense of personal identity and lay the foundation for long-term goal pursuit. 
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A fascinating feature of the human mind is its ability to temporarily disengage from current 
sensory input to mentally simulate alternatives to the here and now. During our daily 
activities, our minds indeed frequently drift away from the task at hand and focus on various 
thoughts and mental images that are only loosely (if at all) related to our immediate 
environment. These thoughts can be remarkably varied in their content and phenomenology, 
yet a bit of introspection readily indicates that many of them involve self-referential 
information—memories of personal experiences, anticipations of and plans about one’s 
future, evaluations of one’s personal characteristics and life situations, thoughts about one’s 
social relationships, and so on. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the nature, neural 
correlates, and possible functions of such self-referential thoughts.  
 
The centrality of self-referential thought when the mind wanders  
The occurrence of thoughts that are not tied to the immediate environment (here 
referred to as “task-unrelated thought”)1 is a frequent phenomenon: on average, people’s 
minds wander between 25 and 50% of the time in daily life, although there is substantial 
individual and situational variability in this respect (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth & 
Gilbert, 2010; Song & Wang, 2012). Furthermore, many of the thoughts (around 30%) that 
people experience in their daily life are judged to be spontaneous (Klinger & Cox, 1987). It 
has long been proposed that the content of daydreaming and mind-wandering is not random 
                                                          
1
 Mind-wandering involves “a shift in the contents of thought away from an ongoing task and/or from events in 
the external environment to self-generated thoughts and feelings” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Importantly, 
however, mind-wandering is a type of thought that is not only characterized by its content but also by its 
spontaneous and dynamic nature; it involves thoughts that arise freely due to an absence of strong constraints on 
thought contents and on the transitions from one thought to another (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-
Hanna, 2016). In empirical research on mind-wandering, terms referring to the content (such as “task-unrelated” 
and “stimulus-independent” thought) or spontaneous nature of mind-wandering are sometimes used 
interchangeably, which is problematic because these terms designate separable dimensions of thought (Christoff 
et al., 2016). Whenever possible, in this chapter I use the term “task-unrelated thought” when describing 
empirical research that investigated mind-wandering from a content-based perspective (i.e., by assessing the 
contents of thoughts in terms of their relationship to an ongoing task or activity), and the term “spontaneous 
thought” when describing research that assessed the unconstrained nature of thoughts. 
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but is often focused on self-relevant information, such as personal goals and concerns 
(Klinger, 2013; J. L. Singer, 1998; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), and recent research on the 
characteristics of task-unrelated and spontaneous thoughts largely supports this view. 
A number of studies have investigated the properties of mind-wandering episodes 
occurring while performing various tasks in the laboratory. Using a retrospective 
questionnaire administered after task completion to assess subjective aspects of mind-
wandering, Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, and Buckner (2010) found that task-unrelated 
thoughts were often judged to revolve around personally relevant concerns. Similarly, 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden, and D’Argembeau (2011) collected subjective 
ratings of mind-wandering episodes occurring in the context of a sustained attention task and 
found that, on average, participants rated their thoughts as personally important and related to 
their goals. In a study by Baird, Smallwood, and Schooler (2011), participants reported the 
content of their mental states at several occasions during a choice reaction time task, and the 
subsequent coding of described thoughts revealed that the majority of task-unrelated thoughts 
(66%) included specific mentions of the individual’s self. Relatedly, Cole and Berntsen 
(2016) observed that memories and future thoughts that were spontaneously activated during 
a vigilance task were frequently linked to the participants’ current concerns.  
Investigations of how different thought characteristics relate to each other also point to 
self-relevance as a central dimension of mind-wandering. For example, Stawarczyk, Cassol, 
and D’Argembeau (2013) had participants rate various characteristics of task-unrelated 
thoughts and applied a multi-level factor analysis to these data. The results showed that 
personal significance was an important factor explaining variations in thought characteristics, 
with dimensions that loaded most strongly on this factor being the importance of thought 
content, relationship to personal goals, and frequency of occurrence in daily life. In the same 
vein, other studies have indicated that self-relatedness is a central dimension characterizing 
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task-unrelated thought content (Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, 
Sackur, & Singer, 2013). 
The self-relevance of mind-wandering has likewise been demonstrated in studies 
investigating the characteristics of thoughts in daily life. Using an experience-sampling 
method to assess task-unrelated thought content, Song and Wang (2012) found that most 
mind-wandering episodes were related to one’s self and personal life. Andrews-Hanna et al. 
(2013) asked participants to report and assess a series of thoughts that had been recently in 
their minds in daily life. Although the characteristics of reported thoughts varied widely, on 
average, participants characterized their thoughts as highly self-relevant. Furthermore, when 
examining the relationships between the different characteristics of thoughts using 
hierarchical clustering analysis, it was found that personal significance was an important 
dimension characterizing thought content.  
Other studies have focused more specifically on particular types of self-related 
thoughts. For example, in a series of studies by Berntsen and colleagues (e.g., Berntsen, 1996; 
Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Finnbogadottir & Berntsen, 2013), participants monitored the 
occurrence of involuntary (spontaneous) autobiographical memories and future thoughts in 
their daily life and recorded their characteristics in a diary. Overall, these studies have shown 
that involuntary autobiographical memories and future thoughts are common in daily life, are 
often activated in response to situational cues, and typically arise in states of diffuse attention. 
In summary, a number of studies using various methods to assess mind-wandering in 
the laboratory or in natural settings converge to show that task-unrelated and spontaneous 
thoughts are frequent and often involve personally significant contents. The next section 




Varieties of self-referential thought  
Self-referential thoughts can vary widely in their content, specificity, and temporal 
orientation. Some thoughts rely on personal semantic information, such as abstract 
representations of one’s personal characteristics (e.g., one’s personality traits, abilities, goals, 
social roles, preferences, and values) and knowledge of facts about one’s life (Klein & Gangi, 
2010; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012). 
Other thoughts involve the mental simulation of specific life episodes, either events that 
occurred in one’s personal past or situations that might happen in one’s personal future 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Schacter, 2012; Szpunar, 2010). Although the extent 
to which the wandering mind involves these different types of self-referential thought remains 
to be investigated in detail, current evidence suggests that it tends preferentially toward 
particular forms. 
One of the most consistent findings has been that the wandering mind focuses most 
frequently on future events. For example, Smallwood, Nind, and O’Connor (2009) observed 
that task-unrelated thoughts that occurred while performing an undemanding task were mostly 
future-oriented, a finding that has been replicated in several laboratory studies of mind-
wandering (Baird et al., 2011; Ruby, Smallwood, Engen, et al., 2013; Ruby, Smallwood, 
Sackur, et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2011; Stawarczyk et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, 
Maj, et al., 2011). Similarly, studies investigating the characteristics of task-unrelated 
thoughts in daily life have shown that most thoughts focus on the future (Andrews-Hanna et 
al., 2013; Song & Wang, 2012). Furthermore, there is evidence that future-oriented mind-
wanderings are perceived as more personally significant than non-future-oriented mind-
wanderings (Stawarczyk et al., 2013), and often involve the anticipation and planning of 
personally relevant future goals (Baird et al., 2011).  
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The future-orientation of task-unrelated thoughts seems particularly pronounced when 
self-relevant information is salient in a person’s mind. Indeed, research has shown that 
priming personally significant contents increases the prospective bias of mind-wandering. 
Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj et al. (2011) asked participants to write an essay about their 
personal goals or about a topic unrelated to personal goals (i.e., a familiar itinerary); then, the 
temporal focus of mind-wandering during an unrelated task was assessed. The results showed 
that participants who had previously thought about their personal goals subsequently 
experienced more future-oriented mind-wandering. In a related vein, Smallwood et al. (2011) 
found that making people think about their personality traits increased future-oriented mind-
wandering in a subsequent task. 
Other data suggest that, although task-unrelated thoughts can vary widely in their 
representational format and degree of abstraction, they most often focus on specific events. 
Andrews-Hanna et al. (2013) found that 77% of thoughts reported to happen in daily life 
pertained to a specific event and, of these, 60% were oriented towards the future. Similarly, 
Stawarczyk et al. (2013) found that the contents of mind-wandering episodes were mostly 
related to something concrete and well-defined (e.g., a particular situation or action). Some 
studies have further compared the characteristics of spontaneous versus voluntary 
autobiographical representations, showing that spontaneous memories and future thoughts are 
typically more specific than their voluntary counterparts (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Cole, 
Staugaard, & Berntsen, 2015).  
Altogether, these findings indicate that the wandering mind can represent diverse 
contents and take various forms, but most often involves the representation of specific future 
events that are closely related to one’s personal goals (for a more in-depth discussion, see the 




Neural correlates of directed and spontaneous self-referential thought  
Neuroimaging research has shown that mind-wandering is associated with activations 
in a specific set of brain regions, which largely corresponds to the so-called default network 
(Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008) and includes the medial prefrontal cortex, 
posterior cingulate/precuneus, inferior parietal lobules, and areas of the medial and lateral 
temporal lobes (e.g., Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Mason et al., 
2007; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maquet, & D’Argembeau, 2011) (for meta-analyses, see Fox, 
Spreng, Ellamil, Andrews-Hanna, & Christoff, 2015; Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015). 
Many of these regions are also activated when people are explicitly instructed to process self-
related information, which provides additional support to the view that self-referential thought 
is an important component of the mind-wandering state. This section first presents an 
overview of the neural correlates of different types of self-representation (as revealed by task-
based studies), and then considers the few studies that have investigated the neural correlates 
of task-unrelated and spontaneous self-referential thought.  
The neural correlates of different types of self-representation have been extensively 
investigated using functional neuroimaging. Some studies have focused on personal semantic 
knowledge, such as the representation of one’s personality traits. In a typical study (e.g., 
Kelley et al., 2002), participants are asked to evaluate the self-descriptiveness of traits (e.g., 
polite, dependable, daring) and this task is compared to making other types of trait 
judgements (e.g., assessing their descriptiveness in reference to another person). Several 
meta-analyses have shown that both self- and other-referential judgments engage regions 
supporting semantic processing (such as the lateral temporal cortex), and the medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC) is typically more activated during self- vs. other-referential judgments 
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(Araujo, Kaplan, & Damasio, 2013; Murray, Schaer, & Debbane, 2012; van der Meer, 
Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010). Research further suggests that the mPFC is involved in 
processing different types of personal semantic information: not only one’s personality traits, 
but also one’s attitudes, values, and physical attributes (e.g., Brosch, Coppin, Schwartz, & 
Sander, 2012; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2011; Zysset, Huber, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2002). 
The neural basis of autobiographical memory—memories of one’s past experiences 
and knowledge of facts about one’s life—has also received extensive attention (for a review, 
see Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007). In many studies, memories of specific personal experiences 
(i.e., events that happened at a particular place and time in an individual’s life) are compared 
with the retrieval of non-personal information (e.g., non-personal semantic knowledge or 
stimuli that have been learned in the laboratory before the scanning session). Neuroimaging 
evidence indicates that such autobiographical memory retrieval is associated with activations 
in the mPFC, medial and lateral temporal areas, posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, and 
inferior parietal lobes (for meta-analyses, see Kim, 2012; Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 
2013; McDermott, Szpunar, & Christ, 2009; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Svoboda, 
McKinnon, & Levine, 2006). Furthermore, lesion data have revealed that damage to these 
areas is associated with deficits in autobiographical memory retrieval (Philippi, Tranel, Duff, 
& Rudrauf, 2015). 
A recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies (Martinelli et al., 2013) has compared 
the neural correlates of different types of self-referential thought—representations of personal 
characteristics (such as personality traits), knowledge of personal facts, and memories for 
specific events. The results show that each type of self-referential thought is associated with 
unique brain activations, with a shift from posterior to anterior regions with increasing 
abstraction of representations. Indeed, specific memories predominantly activate posterior 
structures, including the medial and lateral temporal lobes and posterior cingulate/precuneus, 
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whereas abstract representations of personal characteristics only recruit medial prefrontal 
structures; finally, knowledge of personal facts is associated with anterior activations, as well 
as posterior structures (mainly the lateral temporal cortex). Interestingly, the mPFC is the only 
brain region that is consistently activated when thinking about one’s traits, retrieving specific 
experiences from one’s past, and accessing knowledge of facts about one’s life, with both 
common and distinct activations across these three kinds of self-referential thought.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the wandering mind often focuses on future 
events and involves the processing of personal goals. The neural correlates of future-oriented 
and goal-directed thought are thus of particular interest. Neuroimaging studies in which 
participants are explicitly instructed to reflect on their personal goals have shown that this 
process recruits areas of the default network. For example, Johnson et al. (2006) asked 
participants to think about their hopes and aspirations, about their duties and obligations, and 
about non-self‑relevant topics (e.g., polar bear fishing). The results showed that the mPFC, 
posterior cingulate/precuneus, and lateral temporal cortex were more activated when thinking 
about personal goals than when thinking about non-self‑relevant topics. There were also 
distinct activations as a function of the type of personal goals considered: a region of the 
mPFC showed greater activation when thinking about hopes and aspirations, whereas a 
posterior medial region showed greater activation when thinking about duties and obligations. 
Subsequent studies have detected similar activations in the mPFC, posterior cingulate, and 
lateral temporal cortex when reflecting on personal goals, especially promotion goals (i.e., 
things the individual would like to achieve) (for a meta-analysis, see Stawarczyk & 
D’Argembeau, 2015). 
In recent years there has also been increasing interest in episodic future thinking—the 
ability to imagine or simulate specific events that might happen in one’s personal future 
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(D’Argembeau, 2012; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Szpunar, 2010). A number of 
neuroimaging studies have shown that such mental simulations of future events depend on 
largely the same brain regions as autobiographical remembering—the mPFC, posterior 
cingulate and restrosplenial cortices, medial and lateral temporal regions, inferior parietal 
lobules, and parts of the lateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; 
Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; for a meta-analysis, see Benoit & Schacter, 2015). 
These different brain regions likely support different component processes involved in 
episodic future thought; for example, the medial temporal lobe may support the flexible 
retrieval and recombination of episodic details to construct representations of novel events 
(Addis & Schacter, 2012), whereas the lateral temporal cortex may represent semantic 
knowledge that is used for constructing coherent events (Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 
2012).  
A few studies have investigated whether personal goal processing is associated with 
specific activations within this core network supporting episodic future thought. It has been 
found that medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices are more activated when thinking 
about goal-related compared to goal-unrelated future events, suggesting that cortical midline 
structures may underpin the processing of personal goals during episodic future thinking 
(D’Argembeau et al., 2010). In line with this view, a recent meta-analysis has shown that 
studies of episodic future thinking and studies of personal goal processing are associated with 
overlapping activations in the mPFC and posterior cingulate cortex, as well as other regions of 
the core network (Stawarczyk & D’Argembeau, 2015). It has also been found that imagining 
taking various steps and actions to achieve personal goals depends on the functional coupling 
of the core network with the frontoparietal control network, a system supporting cognitive 
control (Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010). Thus, the frontoparietal 
control network may also contribute to personal goal processing, perhaps by monitoring and 
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integrating future-oriented thoughts in coherent sequences to achieve imagined end-states. A 
recent study has further clarified the role of distinct brain areas in personal goal processing by 
showing that imagining what it would be like to achieve a given goal mainly involves the 
mPFC, whereas constructing a detailed plan of how to reach this goal engages regions from 
both the core network and the frontroparietal control network (Gerlach, Spreng, Madore, & 
Schacter, 2014). 
While many studies have investigated the neural correlates of self-referential thought 
using directed self-processing tasks, only a few studies have examined the brain regions 
associated with task-unrelated and spontaneous self-referential thought. Some studies 
investigated thought processes spontaneously occurring when people were not required to 
perform a particular task (the so-called resting state). In a pioneering study, Andreasen et al. 
(1995) used positron emission tomography (PET) to investigate similarities and differences in 
neural activity between the explicit retrieval of autobiographical memories and a rest 
condition (i.e., lying quietly with no specific instructions about mental activity). They found 
that the mPFC and medial posterior areas (precuneus/retrosplenial cortex) showed greater 
activity during both autobiographical memory retrieval and rest compared to a semantic 
memory condition. Interviews with the participants indicated that they spontaneously thought 
about a variety of things during the rest condition, but especially about self-related contents 
such as past experiences and future activities. The authors concluded that the psychological 
commonality between the rest and autobiographical memory conditions is that “both involve 
something personal and highly individual” (p. 1583). 
Another PET study examined the commonalities in brain activation between the 
resting state and the active reflection on one’s personality traits (D’Argembeau et al., 2005). It 
was found that both conditions were associated with common activation in the mPFC 
compared with conditions requiring participants to reflect on non-self-related contents. 
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Furthermore, an analysis of the content of mental activity (using verbal reports and rating 
scales obtained after each scan) showed that participants spontaneously experienced self-
referential thought during the rest condition, and the amount of self-referential processing 
correlated specifically with the activity of the mPFC. Common activations in the mPFC and 
posterior cingulate cortex during the resting state and directed self-reference tasks have also 
been observed in a more recent fMRI study (Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011), and have been 
confirmed by a meta-analysis comparing the location of activations in neuroimaging studies 
on the default network (i.e., brain regions showing stronger activation during the resting state 
compared to active tasks) with the location of activations associated with various self-related 
tasks (e.g., trait judgments, autobiographical memory, face recognition, and name perception) 
(Qin & Northoff, 2011).  
There is also evidence that self-referential thoughts that occur while performing an 
unrelated task are associated with similar neural correlates as directed self-referential 
thoughts. Stawarczyk and D’Argembeau (2015) performed a meta-analysis of neuroimaging 
studies of episodic future thinking on the one hand, and a meta-analysis of neuroimaging 
studies of mind-wandering on the other hand. A conjunction analysis showed that these two 
types of studies were associated with common activations in several regions of the default 
network, including the mPFC, posterior cingulate cortex, left inferior parietal cortex, and left 
medial and lateral temporal regions. Considering that most mind-wandering episodes are 
future-oriented (see above), this finding suggests that task-based and task-unrelated future 
thoughts are supported by largely similar brain regions. Some differences between the two 
kinds of self-referential thoughts were also noted, however. In particular, the lateral prefrontal 
cortex showed greater activity during directed future thinking compared to mind-wandering. 
Similarly, it has been found that voluntary episodic memories involve the lateral prefrontal 
cortex to a greater extent than involuntary episodic memories, with otherwise extensive 
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overlaps in default network activity between the two kinds of memories (Hall et al., 2014). 
Together, these results suggest that directed and spontaneous self-referential thoughts share 
many commonalities, but may differ in the extent to which they rely on effortful cognitive 
processes (see also Dixon, Fox, & Christoff, 2014). 
In summary, neuroimaging studies have shown that directed self-referential thoughts 
are associated with activations in a set of brain regions that largely corresponds to the default 
network. The specific areas that are recruited depend on the type of self-representation under 
consideration, with abstract thoughts relying mainly on the mPFC and lateral temporal cortex, 
while more specific (past or future) thoughts recruit additional regions supporting the 
representation of episodic details (e.g., the medial temporal lobe and posterior 
cingulate/restroplenial cortex). A number of studies and meta-analyses have further 
demonstrated that many of the same areas are activated during the resting state or in 
association with mind-wandering, suggesting that these brain regions are involved in 
spontaneous or unconstrained self-referential thought processes. Across all these studies, the 
mPFC is the brain region that has been most consistently associated with different types of 
self-representation, indicating that this region might play a particularly important role in both 
intentional and spontaneous self-referential cognition.  
 
What is the role of the medial prefrontal cortex in self-referential thought? 
While it has become clear that the mPFC plays a key role in self-referential thought, 
the exact processing operations mediated by this region are not fully understood. One 
possibility is that the mPFC contributes to appraise or represent the subjective value or 
significance of self-related information. Indeed, the mPFC is thought to play a broad role in 
affective and value-based processing (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). Most notably, 
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research has shown that medial prefrontal activity encodes the subjective values of various 
types of rewards, which has led to the view that the mPFC integrates information from 
multiple sources to represent the significance or value of stimuli (for review, see Levy & 
Glimcher, 2012; Peters & Buchel, 2010b; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Sescousse, Caldu, Segura, & 
Dreher, 2013). Although these studies focused on the subjective valuation of stimuli from the 
external environment, the medial prefrontal activations that are observed in relation to self-
referential thought could reflect a similar valuation mechanism (D’Argembeau, 2013). Stimuli 
and mental representations that refer or relate to the self tend to be assigned unique value, and 
the function of the mPFC may precisely be to evaluate or represent such significance. This 
account is, for example, supported by the finding that activity in the mPFC increases linearly 
with the personal importance of the mental representations under consideration (Andrews-
Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; D’Argembeau et al., 2012). By flexibly 
assigning degrees of value to self-related contents, the mPFC might play an important role in 
the construction, stabilization, and modification of self-representations. 
Another (not necessarily mutually exclusive but somewhat broader) view is that the 
mPFC supports the integration of multiple representations during self-referential thought. It 
has been proposed that self-reference acts as an integrative hub for perception, decision 
making, and memory, helping to bind together different types of information and even 
different stages of processing (Sui & Humphreys, 2015). In support of this view, there is for 
example evidence that people recall more episodic details about items judged in reference to 
the self, suggesting that self-reference enhances the binding of different forms of information 
in memory (e.g., items and associated contextual details) (Conway, Dewhurst, Pearson, & 
Sapute, 2001). A potential role of the mPFC in this integrative process is suggested by 
evidence showing that the self-reference effect in memory is predicted by medial prefrontal 
activity in healthy individuals (Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004) and is 
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abolished in patients with focal brain damage to the mPFC (Philippi, Duff, Denburg, Tranel, 
& Rudrauf, 2012). More generally, there is substantial evidence that the mPFC is involved in 
relating and integrating incoming information to pre-existing knowledge structures (Brod, 
Werkle-Bergner, & Shing, 2013; Kroes & Fernández, 2012; Preston & Eichenbaum, 2013; 
van Kesteren, Ruiter, Fernández, & Henson, 2012).  
The integration of multiple representations may be particularly important for 
autobiographical remembering and future thinking, which inherently involve different types 
or levels of self-related information (Conway, 2005; D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011). For 
example, there is evidence that specific memories and future thoughts are often part of higher-
order autobiographical knowledge structures that organize specific events in broader themes 
and causal sequences—referred to as event clusters (Brown & Schopflocher, 1998; 
D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012). In a recent fMRI study, we found that the processing of 
such event clusters is associated with increased activation in the mPFC and with greater 
functional coupling between the mPFC and posterior regions supporting semantic and 
episodic representations (Demblon, Bahri, & D’Argembeau, 2016). These findings suggest 
that the function of the mPFC during autobiographical remembering and future thinking 
might be to integrate specific event representations with higher-order autobiographical 
knowledge (e.g., personal goals and general knowledge about one’s life). Through this 
integrative process, the mPFC might contribute to contextualize specific event representations 
within an individual’s life story, thus rendering memories and future thoughts truly 
autobiographical. 
 
On the possible functions of spontaneous self-referential thought 
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The fact that mind-wandering is such a pervasive experience makes it unlikely that it 
merely consists in a lapse of attention with no intrinsic value. On the contrary, there is 
growing evidence suggesting that mind-wandering may serve adaptive functions, such as 
planning (Baird et al., 2011) and problem solving (Ruby, Smallwood, Sackur, et al., 2013). 
The main function of mind-wandering might be to allow the mental simulation of 
alternatives to the here and now, and in particular to envision possible futures. As mentioned 
above, most mind-wandering episodes indeed involve future-oriented and goal-related 
contents. The wandering mind may anticipate a variety of future events, conceive possible 
ways to attain or avoid envisioned situations, and predict the probable outcomes of different 
courses of action. In turn, these mental simulations may be used to inform decisions and 
behaviors. Many mind-wandering episodes are subjectively perceived as fulfilling such 
future-oriented functions—evaluating and planning for possible situations, making decisions, 
and solving problems (Stawarczyk et al., 2013; Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, et al., 2011). 
Although the extent to which such future-oriented thoughts are beneficial in guiding decisions 
and behavior remains to be investigated in detail, recent evidence suggests that this might be 
the case. For example, a recent study suggests that mind-wandering can help people to better 
specify their goals and plans, which might lead to more effective goal achievement (Medea et 
al., 2016). Furthermore,  it has also been found that mind-wandering (Smallwood, Ruby, & 
Singer, 2013) and future thinking (Lin & Epstein, 2014) are associated with reduced delay 
discounting (i.e., with a greater capacity to resist the temptation of an immediate reward in 
favor of receiving a larger reward later in the future). Interestingly, neuroimaging studies 
suggest that the mPFC might mediate this effect of future-oriented thoughts on farsighted 
decisions (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; Bernhardt et al., 2014; Peters & Buchel, 2010a). 
Another potentially important function of mind-wandering may be to contribute to our 
sense of personal identity. People in modern societies construct their personal identity by 
18 
 
creating an evolving life story that integrates past, present, and possible future experiences in 
such a way as to provide their lives with some degree of unity, purpose, and meaning 
(McAdams, 2001; J. A. Singer, Blagov, Berry, & Oost, 2013). The construction of such 
narratives critically depends on autobiographical reasoning, a process of reflective thinking 
through which we form links between disparate elements of our life and the self (Habermas & 
Bluck, 2000). Autobiographical reasoning helps in establishing personal identity and 
continuity across change, and research has shown the importance of this process for identity 
development, maturity, and well-being (King, Scollon, Ramsey, & Williams, 2000; 
Lilgendahl & McAdams, 2011; McLean & Pratt, 2006; Raffard et al., 2010; J. A. Singer, 
Rexhaj, & Baddeley, 2007). Intriguingly, a recent study (D’Argembeau et al., 2014) has 
shown that the neural correlates of autobiographical reasoning closely correspond to a 
dorsomedial prefrontal subsystem of the default network, which might play a broad role in 
introspective processes (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Although this issue remains to be 
investigated in detail, this might suggest that spontaneous self-referential thought plays a role 
in reflecting on the broader meaning and implications of personal experiences, thereby 
contributing to the construction, maintenance, and update of an individual’s life story. In 
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related contents. While the specific function of this brain region remains to be investigated in 
detail, current evidence suggests that it might process the subjective value of self-related 
information and/or integrate multiple representations in the service of self-referential thought. 
Overall, the tendency of the wandering mind to focus on self-related contents may foster 
one’s sense of personal identity and serve adaptive functions, such as planning and long-term 
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